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THE RELATION BETWEEN JUSTICE AND
LOVE IN THE NATURAL ORDER
REV. JOHN A. PERRICONEt
If therefore thou offer thy gift at the altar, and there thou
remember that thy brother hath any thing against thee; Leave
there thy offering before the altar, and go first to be reconciled
to thy brother: and then coming thou shalt offer thy gift.'
And one of those robbers who were hanged, blasphemed him,
saying: If thou be Christ, save thyself and us. But the other
answering, rebuked him, saying: Neither dost thou fear God,
seeing thou art condemned under the same condemnation? And
we indeed justly, for we receive the due reward of our deeds; but
this man hath done no evil.2
The perennially true Scholastic axiom, distinguish in order
to unite, should guide any discussion of questions of great
moment. Its neglect reaches far beyond irritating abstract
anomalies annoying only to the privileged academic elite.
Existential consequences result from this neglect that produce
human suffering as well as the erosion of the common good.
Donoso Cortes confirms this principle in a slightly different
context when he writes, "Imagined paradises generate real
hells."'
Our present circumstances verify the need for careful
distinction and definition, especially regarding the nature of
justice and love. Confusion regarding both has produced untold
agonies of a rigid, ideological kind-for example, Communism
and National Socialism-as well as a "soft kind"-for example,
t Professor of Philosophy, St. Francis College, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
Matthew 5:23-24 (Douay-Rheims).
2 Luke 23:39-41.
R. A. HERRERA, DONOSO CORTES: CASSANDRA OF THE AGE 76 (1995).
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Democracy.' Returning to a review of these subjects promises
rich rewards, and none less important than the relief of our
present straitened predicament.
Lest this exercise be seen as one in redundancy, it might be
helpful to listen to Josef Pieper in the early pages of his classic
treatment of justice: "Fundamental truths must constantly be
pondered anew lest they lose their fruitfulness."5
In fact, a facile ignoring of the proper contours of justice and
its authentic importance will have a chilling impact on humanity
and society. Again, I quote Pieper, writing with uncharacteristic
pique:
We would do well to bear in mind that the uttermost perversion
of mankind lies not in excess, which can easily be read in man's
bearing and behavior, but in injustice, which, being essentially
of the spirit, is not so readily distinguishable. We ought to be
prepared to find that the most powerful embodiment of evil in
human history, the Antichrist, might well appear in the guise of
a great ascetic. This is, in fact, the almost unanimous lesson of
historical thinking in the West. Whoever does not understand
that it is injustice which is natural man's worst destroyer, and
the reason why, will be thrown into overwhelming confusion by
the experiences announced in such visions. Above all, he will be
powerless to recognize the historical heralds of the abyss. For,
even while he watches out in the wrong direction, the forces of
destruction will establish their mastery right before his very
eyes.6
Not as obvious, but certainly as palpable, is the
misunderstanding of love which besets our times. Like justice,
this essential human pursuit can undergo a corruption which
leaves love strangling the human person rather than
transforming him. Flannery O'Connor touches upon this when
she writes not specifically of love, but one its epiphenomena,
tenderness:
If other ages felt less, they saw more, even though they saw
with the blind, prophetical, unsentimental eye of acceptance,
which is to say, of faith. In the absence of this faith now, we
4 See ALExIS DE TOCQUEvILLE, 2 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Henry Reeve et. al,
eds., Vintage Classics 1990) (1835).
6 JOSEF PIEPER, THE FOUR CARDINAL VIRTUES: PRUDENCE, JUSTICE,
FORTITUDE, TEMPERANCE 51 (Richard Winston et al. trans., Harcourt, Brace &
World 1965) (1954).
6 Id. at 68-69.
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govern by tenderness. It is a tenderness which, long since cut
off from the person of Christ, is wrapped in theory. When
tenderness is detached from the source of tenderness, its logical
outcome is terror. It ends in forced-labor camps and in the
fumes of the gas chamber.'
Not to belabor the disorders of love, but some comments of
Dr. Philip Rieff are apposite here. As columnist Katherine A.
Kersten notes, Dr. Rieff, in his Triumph of the Therapeutic,
discusses not so much the corruption of love, but of religion, the
principal bearer of love:
"Independence (sic) from all gods," [psychological man] is drawn
to "any faith that lends itself to therapeutic use." By [drawing
away from] faith [any] doctrinal content, psychological man
reduces religion to a free-floating spirituality. He can embrace
any faith, so long as it makes no real moral demands-consoles
but does not judge.
... [The human person] is not a sinner in need of forgiveness
and atonement but a "patient" in need of nonjudgmental care.8
Not only are proper definitions of love and justice necessary,
but a close examination of the manner in which the two relate is
critical as well. Improperly mixing these foundational virtues
has perpetrated too much mischief. The order of individual
perfection is to always be distinguished from the order of the
common good. Though there is an obvious and necessary
intersection, there are also boundaries that must be heeded.
Neglecting these perimeters can easily lead to the weakening of
both love and justice, if not their perversion.
And this examination is not merely attention to the "public"
versus the "private." This too can collapse into the baneful
gutters of atomistic individualism rather than the lustrous
individuality of justice properly wedded to love. As the logicians
remind us, in order for there to be a proper relation between
justice and love, their separate identities must be respected: A
thing must be itself and not another. Relation can only thrive
where robust identity thrives. As things lose their identities,
7 FLANNERY O'CONNOR, MYSTERY AND MANNERS 227 (Farrar, Straus & Giroux
1969).
' Katherine A. Kersten, Taste-To Hell with Sin When 'Being a Good Person'
Excuses Everything, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 1999, at W15 (quoting PHILIP RIEFF, THE
TRIUMPH OF THE THERAPEUTIC: USES OF FAITH AFTER FREUD 27 (Chatto & Windus
1966)).
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relations become more and more impossible. As our age lets slip
through its hands an authentic metaphysics of the human
person-that is, the proper nature of the human person-modern
man finds the prospect of relation more and more remote.
Isolation and alienation quickly follow, with "hooking up"
becoming the ersatz love. C. S. Lewis called this appalling
condition by one of his most famous book titles, The Abolition of
Man.9
Justice is incoherent unless we clearly talk about man-that
is, the true nature of man. So we have St. Thomas saying, "It is
through creation that the created being first comes to have his
rights."o Notice-attention is drawn first to creation, then to
rights. Rights only exist in the context of the created human
person. The person is a creature designed by God in a certain
and most particular manner. To be sure, that creation discloses
its requirements for "being"-that is, its obligations. Put another
way, the possibilities for a man to fruitfully exercise his existence
inherently depends upon his being himself. That fruitfulness is
realized by executing the imperatives of his nature. Those
"imperatives" take form-in both the classical tradition and in
Roman Catholicism-as the natural moral law. Since each
human person is entitled to be himself, that entitlement
translates as "rights." Clearly, these "rights" are delineated in
intimate connection with man's nature, and man's nature
receives its origin in God, as creatura. Pieper draws out the
metaphysical resonance:
Man, however, is a person-a spiritual being, a whole unto
himself, a being that exists for itself and of itself, that wills its
own proper perfection. Therefore, and for that very reason,
something is due to man in the fullest sense, for that reason he
does inalienably have a suum, a "right" which he can plead
against everyone else, a right which imposes upon every one of
his partners the obligation at least not to violate it. Indeed,
man's personality, "the constitution of his spiritual being by
virtue of which he is master of his own actions," even requires
(requirit), says Thomas, that Divine Providence guide the
personality "for his own sake." Moreover, he takes literally that
marvelous expression from the Book of Wisdom: Even God
9 C. S. LEWIS, THE ABOLITION OF MAN (1947).
10 PIEPER, supra note 5, at 46 (quoting ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA CONTRA
GENTILES bk. II, ch. 28).
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Himself disposes of us "with great reverence" (cum magna
reverentia). In the same chapter of the Summa contra Gentiles
in which this statement occurs the concept of the personality is
set forth in all its elements: its freedom, imperishability, and
responsibility for the whole of the world. If, on the contrary,
man's personality is not acknowledged to be something wholly
and entirely real, then right and justice cannot possibly be
established."
A remarkable metaphysical density is presented here.
Anchored in the createdness of the person, there springs forth a
constellation of duties intrinsic and incumbent upon every person
that every other person is mandated, by virtue of being himself,
to honor in every circumstance. So grounded in natura is this
construal of "rights" that their "inalienability" literally means
that, without them, the human person cannot exist, and certainly
never flourish. The human person suffers a demeaning
diminution any time his obligations to execute his "duties"-
which are synonymous with his "rights"-are abridged. Justice
is therefore the recognition and guarantee that each receives his
due-that is, the prerogatives of his very personhood. Again,
Pieper:
There is another, more forceful, way of stating the case. That
something belongs to a man inalienably means this: the man
who does not give a person what belongs to him, withholds it or
deprives him of it, is really doing harm to himself; he is the one
who actually loses something-indeed, in the most extreme
case, he even destroys himself. At all events, something
incomparably worse befalls him than happens to the one who
suffers an injustice: that is how inviolable the right is! ...
Socrates has formulated this point over and over again-the
person who does an injustice is "to be pitied": . .. ["]I maintain,
Callicles, that it is not the most shameful of things to be
wrongfully boxed on the ears, nor again to have either my purse
or my person cut . .. any wrong done to me and mine is at once
more shameful and worse for the wrongdoer than for me the
sufferer." Expressions such as this should not be construed as
simply heroic hyperbole; they are meant as a very precise
n Id. at 50 (quoting ST. THOMAs AQUINAS, SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES bk. III, ch.
112).
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description of the condition that justice belongs to man's true
being. All these statements are sober characterizations of a real
state of affairs: "the inalienability of right."12
Mere mention of the word "rights" today is invariably heard
against the modern din of "rights talk.""a Modernity's chatter
about "rights," nobly sounding as it is, bears no resemblance to
the rich and ample notion of "rights" inherited from the classical
and medieval patrimony that acted as the pillars for the natural
moral law. Ernest Fortin's extensive research on this subject is
like a splash of cold water in the face of a slightly drugged
modern man. As Fr. Fortin explains:
Nowhere in the older tradition does one run across anything
like a theory of natural rights, by which I mean rights that
inhere in individual human beings qua human beings and quite
independently of their membership in the larger society to
which they belong, as distinguished from civil rights or rights
that have their source in some duly enacted law. The passage
from natural law to natural rights and later (once nature had
fallen into disrepute) to "human" rights represents a major
shift, indeed, the paradigm shift in our understanding of justice
and moral phenomena generally. Prior to that time, the
emphasis was on virtue and duty, that is to say, on what human
beings owe to other human beings or to society at large, rather
than on what they can claim for themselves. This emphasis is
surely the case with the Bible, which invites us to think in the
first instance of others rather than of ourselves (we do not need
to be reminded to think of ourselves) and does not promulgate a
Bill of Rights but the Ten Commandments, a Bill of Duties as it
were. But it is also the case with all of premodern literature,
classical as well as Christian, whose foremost representatives-
Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Ambrose, Augustine, and Thomas
Aquinas, to mention a few-wrote treatises or dialogues on
natural right in the singular, on moral virtue, on laws, or on
duties. It never occurred to any of them to publish a book
12 Id. at 47-48 (quoting PLATO, GORGIAS 469, 508).
13 See generally HADLEY ARKES, CONSTITUTIONAL ILLUSIONS AND ANCHORING
TRUTHS: THE TOUCHSTONE OF THE NATURAL LAw (2010); HADLEY ARKES, FIRST
THINGS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND JUSTICE (1986);
JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAw AND NATURAL RIGHTS (2d ed. 2011); MARY ANN
GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991);
RUSSELL KIRK, RIGHTS AND DUTIES: REFLECTIONS ON OUR CONSERVATIVE
CONSTITUTION (Mitchell S. Muncy ed., 1997); HENRY B. VEATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS:
FACT OR FANCY? (1985).
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entitled, The Rights of Man, or to issue such documents as the
Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen or the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.14
Such a lengthy citation is warranted considering the salvo
hurled by Fortin against the mountainous, conventional,
political, philosophical, and theological wisdom on this subject.
Fortin locates this "paradigm shift" in the seventeenth century,
"where the equation is reversed and . .. rights become the
fundamental moral phenomenon, the source rather than the
result of such natural laws as will enable people to live
comfortably and at peace with one another."" He goes on to cite
Thomas Hobbes as emblematic of this modern shift. In Hobbes's
own terms:
The right of nature ... is the liberty each man has to use his
own power as he will himself for the preservation of his own
nature-that is to say, of his own life-and consequently of
doing anything which, in his own judgment and reason, he shall
conceive to be the aptest means thereunto. 6
It is not difficult to notice the straight trajectory from the
1633 Hobbesian etiolated reworking of "rights" to the 1992
Planned Parenthood v. Casey Supreme Court decision with its
now infamous "sweet-mystery-of-life"" assertion, "[a]t the heart
of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life."'"
While no one can improve on Justice Scalia's scathing
attribution, it might also be called the Wonderland decision, for
the strange Kennedy line could well have been ripped from the
pages of Lewis Carroll's Adventures in Wonderland." It still
stuns the average man of common sense that such agitprop could
have migrated onto the pages of the decisions of our nation's
1 Ernest L. Fortin, The Natural Wrong in Natural Rights and the Problem with
Communitarianism, CRISIS, May 1994, at 20 [hereinafter Fortin, The Natural
Wrong] (emphasis added), available at http://www.crisismagazine.com/
1994/the-natural-wrong-in-natural-rights-and-the-problem-with-communitarianism;
cf ERNEST L. FORTIN, Natural Law and Social Justice, in COLLECTED ESSAYS,
CLASSICAL CHRISTIANITY AND THE POLITICAL ORDER 223, 223-38 (J. Brian Benestad
ed., 1996).
15 FORTIN, The Natural Wrong, supra note 14, at 21.
16 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
17 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 588 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
1' Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
19 LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND (Sovereign 2012)
(1872).
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highest Court. Few other Supreme Court decisions nullified
justice for so many-ironically, all in the name of the "rights of
the woman" "0-"modern rights." Casey rivals Dred Scott.2 1
But Fortin is not through. He further exposes the
malignancy buried deeply within high-sounding rhetoric of
"modern rights":
[T]he prototypical premodern understanding of one's
relationship to one's fellow human beings ... is emphatically
not the understanding that informs the original modern rights
approach, which denies the natural sociality of human beings
and views them instead as atoms that are complete in
themselves and hence not essentially dependent on others for
the achievement of their perfection. Not being ordered to any
pre-existing ends, these free-floating individuals are at liberty
to choose their own ends, along with the means by which they
may be attained. In the modern view, the just society grants to
each individual as much freedom as is compatible with the
freedom of every other individual. It has nothing to say about
the good life and is not concerned with the promotion of virtue.
Its sole function is to insure the safety of its members and
provide both for their comfort and, as we now see everywhere,
the satisfaction of their vanity.22
Only upon a philosophical soil of this kind could there sprout
the current controlling philosophical straightjacket of John
Rawl's A Theory of Justice. With his tedious and rigid censures
of "comprehensive world views," he simply attempts to root ever
more deeply the original misconception of justice and rights born
in the seventeenth century.2 3 Ultimately, however, this
postponement of the definitive discussion of man's nature and
true justice frays society. For whether it is one group of men
clinging to their cherished "comprehensive world views" or
simply the disordered liberties of one man vying against another,
the ironic result will be the same Hobbesian war of "all against
all"2 4-prevention of which launched the whole modern
enterprise in the first place.
20 Casey, 505 U.S. at 845.
21 See generally Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857),
superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XJV.
22 Fortin, The Natural Wrong, supra note 14, at 23.
2 See JOHN RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE 10 (rev. ed. 2003).
24 THOMAS HOBBES, ON THE CITIZEN 30 (Richard Tuck & Michael Silverthorne
eds. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1998) (1647).
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Anytime Aquinas speaks of the natural virtues which perfect
the human person and contribute to the flourishing of society, he
never hesitates to rank justice in the highest place. None of the
moral virtues can compete with the high status of justice.
Aquinas writes, "A thing is more eminently good the more fully
and widely it radiates its goodness."2 5 Justice does just that, for
it is always positioned toward the good of the other. It is justice's
very essence to be concerned with that which concerns another's
good: "[Men are ordained to one another by outward acts,
whereby men live in communion with one another."26  Pieper
elaborates:
The as it were concrete efficacy of good is revealed in a higher
manner in justice. For it is in the nature of good to be
"diffusivum sui," not to be limited to its place of origin but to
pour itself out, to work outside itself, to be shared with others,
to shine forth.27
Without hesitancy Aquinas writes, "The good of reason
shines more brightly in justice than in any of the other moral
virtues; justice is closer to reason. Indeed, the good of reason
consists in justice as its proper effect . .. "2 Some might think
that his remark on the perversion of the human good might be
overreaching, but it is consistent with his doctrine on justice's
essence: "The worst disruption of order in the field of things
naturally human, that is, the true perversion of 'human good,'
bears the name 'injustice.' "29
With typical penetration, Aquinas articulates the reason for
the superiority of justice amongst all the cardinal virtues, and
the manner in which intrinsic necessity orders the cardinal
virtues to justice. While temperance and fortitude do not "do the
good"-by restraining desire, anger, or fear-they are not
25 PIEPER, supra note 5, at 65 (quoting ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA CONTRA
GENTILES bk. III, ch. 24).
26 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, pt. I-II, Q. 100, art. 2, at 1038
(Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros. 1947) (1266-
1273) [hereinafter SUMMA THEOLOGIAE].
27 PIEPER, supra note 5, at 65.
28 Id. at 66-67 (footnote omitted) (quoting ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA
THEOLOGIAE, pt. I-II, Q. 66, art. 4, pt. II-II, Q. 124, art. 1).
' Id. at 68.
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properly the realization of the good. However, they do execute
the role of creating the basis-indeed, the indispensable basis-
for the proper execution of the good."
This foundational truth is verified in the history of
monasticism when Pachomius' theological writing gradually
replaced the Anchorite excesses of the Desert Fathers,3 '
eventually relocating monks into communal life rather than
desert isolation.3 2 Then, Cassian's moderating Institutes
permanently cemented the coenobitic monastic existence.3  Of
course, this trend reached its climax in the Rule of St. Benedict.3 4
Cassian remarks that the monk is more perfected by the
opportunities for charity-and justice-presented by a monastic
community than by the rigorous demands of personal asceticism
practiced by an eremitical monasticism. Pieper avers:
Thorough confirmation and corroboration of this surprising
statement comes from the experience of the great ascetics.
Their experience indicates that the real testing of, as well as the
most serious threat to, the inner man, begins only after that
basis [in the virtues of temperance and fortitude] has been
established.36
Any classical treatment of justice necessarily includes a
detailed discussion of the three parts that constitute its essence:
commutative justice, distributive justice, and general legal
justice. A brief examination of commutative justice is pertinent
here. Commutative justice is that part of justice whereby there
occurs an equal exchange between two persons-that is, where
the "individual is just who gives the other person, the unrelated
individual, the stranger, what is his due [debitum]-neither less
nor more."37
30 See SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 26, pt. II-II, Q. 58, art. 6-12, at 1438-
43.
31 MARILYN DUNN, THE EMERGENCE OF MONAsncIsM: FROM THE DESERT
FATHERS TO THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES 16-17 (2003).
32 Id. at 25-33.
- Philip S. Moore, BOOK REVIEW, 26 SPECULUM 497, 497 (1951) (reviewing
OWEN CHADWICK, JOHN CASSIAN: A STUDY IN PRIMITIVE MONASTICISM (1950)).
* Id. at 497-98.
3 Cf Louis BOUYER, INTRODUCTION TO SPIRITUALITY 208 (Collegeville 1961).
36 PIEPER, supra note 5, at 67-68.
3 Id. at 76.
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Pieper intentionally uses the term "stranger." The
unrelatedness of the individuals is critical to grasping the nature
of commutative justice." In fact, the quality of the "stranger," or
the absence of relation between the individuals to the exchange,
rests at the heart of justice. The conspicuous minimalism is
necessary because in justice all that ought to be considered is the
external act or "good" that is owed to the human person, whether
a product, a service, a recompense, or a debt. Over this external
exchange, no other consideration is relevant-as it is in love-
lest the exchange be obscured or distorted. Thus, justice insures
that when the relation of love is absent, the debt to the "other" is
still acknowledged and executed. In fact, in light of this
acknowledgment, it becomes clear how difficult the
administration of justice is between those bound by ties of love.
Moreover, strict cognizance of this crucial aspect of justice is
embodied in art, namely, Lady Justice appearing blindfolded.
She is indifferent to anything but the lineaments of external acts.
The formula that justice is "no respecter of persons" conveys the
same sense.3 9
Before taking up the notion of distributive justice, it is
important to address a concern regarding the seeming
insensitivity of commutative justice, all the more apparent in
light of the greater latitude and richness of distributive justice.
To the objection regarding the paucity of commutative justice,
Pieper replies:
However true it may be that man's communal life cannot attain
its fullest realization through [commutative justice] alone, it is
no less true that in its ideal image the irreducible core of social
relations finds expression, that is the foundation which even the
higher and richer forms of mutual agreement require. 40
What is the "higher and richer" form of justice to which Dr.
Pieper refers? It is distributive justice, and it is indeed "higher
and richer" because it involves guardianship over the bounty of
38 See id. at 77.
9 MANUEL P. ARRIAGA, THE MODERNIST-POSTMODERNIST QUARREL ON
PHILOSOPHY AND JUSTICE: A POSSIBLE LEVINASIAN MEDIATION 133 (2006). An
objection might be raised that courts of law often take into consideration
circumstances that extend beyond the skeletal, external act. But the administration
of justice is an exercise of distributive justice, where the state, represented by the
judge, administers or "distributes" the bounty of the common good. This function
allows considerations beyond the bare external act.
40 PIEPER, supra note 5, at 78.
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the common good. Aquinas teaches that "in distributive justice
something is given to a private individual, in so far as what
belongs to the whole is due to the part."41 Distributive justice
guards and ensures the right order in the relation between those
who "have power" and those who are entrusted or delivered to
that power. Here, the individual is confronted by the "social
whole," where the two partners are not of equal rank because the
common weal belongs to another and higher order than the good
of the individual. Yet, the individual in the relation of
distributive justice is a "partner" with a claim in the relationship;
he is the one to whom something is "due," and the "social whole"
is the partner bound by an obligation, even though the social
whole ranks higher than the individual.
For example, in his relation to the state, the individual's
right to life and health is not so exclusively his that the state
might not require it and curtail it in the interest of the common
good. Against an individual, one may, in an emergency, defend
one's life, health, or property to the extent of killing the
aggressor. On the other hand, public authority can legitimately
deprive an individual of his freedom not only when he has
committed a crime, but also when it happens that, through no
fault of his own, he has fallen victim to a contagious disease that
would endanger the social whole. For that matter, the
administrator of the common good can even make decrees
affecting the individual's property under certain conditions.
Before looking more closely at the nature of the "common
good," it would be well to examine a certain antinomian objection
which chafes at the Thomistic construal regarding the
superiority of the common good and the state administering it.
In actuality, St. Thomas supplies a uniquely supple and nuanced
analysis of the relationship between the individual and common
good. The common good and its "distributors" are clearly of a
higher status because the whole is greater than the part, and the
part simply cannot exist-or be itself-without the whole.4 2
Moreover, while superiority of the common good is manifestly
evident, it is equally evident that the common good and its
guardians are in a natural position to serve the individual with
the richness of the goods that, in a certain sense, belong to the
41 SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 26, pt. II-II, Q. 61, art. 2, at 1452.
42 See id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 2, at 1467.
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individual. Thus, St. Thomas writes, "The act of distributing the
goods of the community, belongs to none but those who exercise
authority over the goods; and yet distributive justice is also in the
subjects to whom those goods are distributed in so far as they are
contented by a just distribution."43 Pieper comments on this
illuminating passage: "It is part of the act of justice to give one's
conscious consent to the just and equitable decrees of a political
authority acting in the interest of the common good ....
Through his act of consenting, the 'subject' takes part in the
ruler's justice.""
Hence, on Thomas' account, a fruitful tension is established,
which preserves the dignity and freedom of the individual while
simultaneously guarding the sovereignty of the state as the
custodian and guarantor of the common good. Aquinas expertly
navigates the Scylla of modernity's individualism and the
Charybdis of totalitarian collectivism.
What of the common good? To the modern ear this term is
anachronistic and alien. Under the weight of the Lockean
"rights" reformulation,4 5 the classical notion of the common good
has been slowly crushed. The individual undergoes a kind of
apotheosis, so that not only does he live solely for his self-
interest, but he no longer requires the communio personae.
Other persons, in the modern scheme, are considered only as
obstacles to self-interest, or as vehicles to self-interest-consider
the individual's compact with the state. As Pierre Manent
expresses it in unadorned starkness which only serves to swell
the Lockean reformulation's danger:
Perhaps we have to say that the revolution of the rights of man
has succeeded beyond its founders' expectations. We have
ended up really becoming individuals constituted by our
relationship to our selves, as was true of the individuals of the
state of nature, and we no longer know how to attach ourselves
to anything common.46
a Id. pt. II-II, Q. 61, art. 1, at 1452 (emphasis added).
4 PIEPER, supra note 5, at 95 (emphasis added).
45 Mark L. Jones, Fundamental Dimensions of Law and Legal Education: An
Historical Framework-A History of U.S. Legal Education Phase I: From the
Founding of the Republic Until the 1860s, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1041, 1146-47
(2006).
46 Pierre Manent, The Greatness and Misery of Liberalism, 52 MODERN AGE 176,
180(2010).
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Nothing is considered "common" in the classical sense,
except the minimal commodities conducive to the fulfillment of
self-interest. From Aristotle to Aquinas, the common good was
construed far more broadly; thus, Aquinas: "The perfection of the
human community demands that there be men who dedicate
themselves to a life of contemplation, a tenet which signifies that
the society of men relies for its functioning on a knowledge of the
truth . . ..
Since the common good embraces not only material
necessities but the spiritual goods of truth, beauty, virtue, and
religion, the state and its citizens share a common telos. Though
each freely pursues his own finis operantis-the end of the
agent-this telos is always ordered to the finis operis-the end of
the person-which the state alone distributes. St. Augustine
teaches that this produces a deep comity resulting from a shared
"love."4 It is that shared "love" that designs laws and
adjudicates them. On the other hand, St. Augustine teaches that
dissipation of the notion of the "common good" results in the
perpetual antagonisms of a city divided against itself. The
American Founding Fathers fully appreciated this liability in
their new republican experiment. They recognized that they
were erecting a neutral vessel which would accommodate self-
interests pursued freely. Though this arrangement was daring
and ultimately impressively fruitful, it suffered a deep internal
incoherence. With nothing more than a procedural perfection,
what comes of coherence that the common good supplies? It was
at this juncture that they assumed that religion would always
furnish that coherence which the state could not. Thus, they
invested religion with special status through the safeguards of
the First Amendment.4 9 Pieper summarizes nicely:
4 PIEPER, supra note 5, at 97-98 (footnote omitted) (citing St. Thomas Aquinas
4 d. 26, 1, 2).
4 See ST. AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD AGAINST THE PAGANS 231-32 (R.W.
Dyson ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1998) (426).
4 See PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 1-5 (2002);
MICHAEL NOVAK, ON Two WINGS: HUMBLE FAITH AND COMMON SENSE AT THE
AMERICAN FOUNDING 78 (2003) ("Their most powerful motive for the Bill of Rights
was not just suspicion of central authority, but above all piety toward those religions
for which the ultimate liberty of each individual is the indispensable precondition.");
MARVIN OLASKY, FIGHTING FOR LIBERTY AND VIRTUE: POLITICAL AND CULTURAL
WARS IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 172-75 (Regnery Publishing 1996). But
see STEVEN WALDMAN, FOUNDING FAITH: PROVIDENCE, POLITICS, AND THE BIRTH OF
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AMERICA 157 (2008) ("The brutal reality is that we cannot
68
RELATION BETWEEN JUSTICE AND LOVE
Taking part in the realization of that good in accordance with
the measure of dignitas, capacity, and ability that is
distinctively his, this is the share which "is due to" the
individual and which cannot be withheld from him by the
person administering the bonum commune without violating
[distributive justice], the justice proper to rulers. This suggests
a much wider reference, namely, that all the good things
bestowed in creation (men's capacities and abilities) belong to
the "good of the community," and that [distributive justice]
entails the obligation of granting such abilities the protection,
support, and fostering they need.o
All this sophisticated metaphysical analysis
notwithstanding, the Christian can never forget that as
heroically as man tries, true and lasting justice will always elude
us in this passing world. Yet this reality does not exempt us
from our best attempts to understand and implement it. But, in
the final analysis, our efforts will disappoint us. In the words of
Luke: "Doth he thank that servant, for doing the things which he
commanded him? I think not. So you also, when you shall have
done all these things that are commanded you, say: We are
unprofitable servants; we have done that which we ought to do.""
Man's thirst for justice will only be fully sated in God's
judgments. Romano Guardini gives a bracing voice to this
sobering recognition:
Only by God will true and complete justice be established, and
only through His judgment. We should try to let the revelation
that this judgment will be passed upon all mankind affect us
deeply. The first thing that everyone who thinks of the
judgment should say to himself is, "Judgment will be passed
upon me!" But there will also be a judgment upon all the
human institutions and powers about which we are so likely to
feel that they are sovereign and subject to no examination: the
state, civilization, history.
The judgment must be taken into account in all being and
action. It is God's verdict upon every finite reality. Without it
everything is half balanced in space. Only God determines it.
necessarily determine their views on the separation of church and state on the local
level from their attitude about the First Amendment.").
5 PIEPER, supra note 5, at 99.
1 Luke 17:9-10 (Douay-Rheims).
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He it is who sees through all, fearing nothing, bound by nothing,
just in eternal truth. If a man does not believe in Him, his
hunger and thirst shall never be satisfied.5 2
Aristotle will never cease to raise eyebrows when he writes,
famously, in Book Eight of the Nicomachean Ethics, "Where,
moreover, friendship exists, there we stand in no need of
justice." Similarly, Aquinas seems to intrude upon the natural
order when he writes, "To be willing to watch over peace and
harmony among men through the commandments of justice is
not enough when charity has not taken firm root among them.""
St. Augustine is even more forceful in the City of God when he
writes, apodictically, that for all Rome's "virtue," Roman rule was
"a fraud" because it lacked the grace of charity.
What of this? Is the state incomplete, indeed, a failure
where love is not practiced? Not exactly. Both pagan and
Christian writers recognize that man operates in two distinct
orders: the natural order-the state-and the order of personal
perfection-virtue or religion. In love, the beloved is not
perceived as "other" or "stranger," but rather one with oneself.
St. Thomas is quite instructive: "[T]o equate caritas with mere
well-wishing, benevolentia, is to define it inadequately .. . the
missing element [is] the 'unio affectus,' volition directed toward
the other person, the wish to be with him, to be united with him,
in fact to identify with him.""
So the Old Testament dictum, "love thy neighbor as
thyself."' Love never measures what should be allotted to the
beloved, as one does not measure how one loves the self. Love is
characterized by its excess. If the beloved is given only what is
his due and nothing more, nothing less, love disappears, and
rightly so.
52 RoMANO GuARDINI, THE VIRTUES: ON FORMS OF MORAL LIFE 43-44 (Stella
Lange trans., 1967).
53 ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHIcS OF ARISTOTLE 218 (Robert Williams
trans., London, Longmans, Green, & Co. 1876).
5 PIEPER, supra note 5, at 112-13 (quoting ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA
CONTRA GENTILES bk. III, ch. 130).
5 ST. AUGUSTINE, supra note 48, at 216-18.
56 JOSEF PIEPER, FAITH, HOPE, LOVE 195-97 (Richard Winston & Clara Winston
trans., Ignatius Press 1997) (1972) (footnote omitted) (quoting St. Thomas Aquinas).
s Leviticus 19:18 (21st Century King James Version).
70
RELATION BETWEEN JUSTICE AND LOVE
But justice cannot operate with such prodigality. Such
indiscriminateness would signal its demise. As Aquinas never
tires of teaching, justice rules in the territory of external acts,
where precise measurements are taken and assessed with proper
deserts ensuing." It is the very form of justice to look no further
than those acts, where that is all that the lover does. Otherwise,
justice is not served, and the social whole undergoes irreparable
injury.
Of course, the state retains the prerogative of dispensing
mercy, a certain species of love, where consideration is
bequeathed to the individual far beyond the imperatives of the
external act. To this application of mercy on the part of the state,
Aquinas writes, "[J]ustice without mercy is cruelty."" Man does
not discount his humanity when he acts, even in the blind
operations of justice. As human, he should temper the strict
sentences of justice with the balm of love. Ignoring this is to
ignore his humanity, which itself is a betrayal of justice-not
permitting all the parts which constitute the person to realize
themselves in the execution of acts.
Withal, Aquinas wastes no time to quickly constrain us with
the correlative, "mercy without justice is the mother of
dissolution."6 In this passage, we are thrust squarely into the
world of reality, where all men must operate along with their
prized virtues. The very beauty of mercy rests upon the reality of
the acts for which the violator of justice is responsible. The stark
relief of justice's deformity as compared to mercy's purity is of the
very essence of mercy's application. Pretending the deformity
does not exist, or naively slighting its ugliness, is a mockery of
both reality and mercy. No, reality must be honored, and justice
must look to nothing but reality. Justice is gravely miscarried
when sentimentality rides roughshod over truth. When actions
do not receive what they deserve, an appalling injustice results
for others. For, while individuals are called to forgive, the
* SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 26, pt. II-II, Q. 61, art. 2, at 1452-53.
59 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, CATENA AUREA: COMMENTARY ON THE FOUR GOSPELS
COLLECTED OUT OF THE WORKS OF THE FATHERS, VOL. 1. ST. MATTHEW 152 (John
Henry Newman ed. & trans., St. Austin Press 1997) (1841).
60 PIEPER, supra note 5, at 112 (quoting ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, CATENA AUREA:
COMMENTARY ON THE FOUR GOSPELS 5, 2 (St. Austin Press 1997)).
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administrators of justice cannot. Theirs is the noble and grave
task to uphold the common good, with one of its highest glories
being justice.
It should not escape our attention that this serious obligation
to the common good is acknowledged by Christ when he declares,
"Render therefore to Caesar the things that are Caesar's; and to
God, the things that are God's." 61 The same tribute to the
common good is unmistakable in the scene of the Passion, when
the Good Thief reproves the other with the words, "Neither dost
thou fear God, seeing thou art condemned under the same
condemnation? And we indeed justly, for we receive the due
reward of our deeds; but this man hath done no evil."6
Apart from the severe visage of justice, it must not be
thought that love lacks some of those severe features itself. Love
possesses a fierceness all its own. Hugh of St. Victor speaks
about the violence of love, no doubt drawing directly from the
Gospels when Christ declares, "And from the days of John the
Baptist until now, the kingdom of heaven suffereth violence, and
the violent bear it away."6  Likely, the action of Christ in the
Temple contributes to this understanding,
And Jesus went into the temple of God, and cast out all them
that sold and bought in the temple, and overthrew the tables of
the money changers, and the chairs of them that sold doves:
And he saith to them: It is written, My house shall be called the
house of prayer; but you have made it a den of thieves. 64
Or, perhaps, it arises from St. Matthew: "Do not think that I
came to send peace upon earth: I came not to send peace, but the
sword.""5 These episodes serve as a corrective to what Cardinal
Newman called "the brighter side of the Gospel.""
Love always seeks the good of the other and that true good
often contrasts with the present condition of the beloved. If that
love is to be desired, then the lover must desire the beloved to
change. Love demands conformity of the beloved to goodness.
When man loves, it is the goodness of the beloved that attracts.
6 Matthew 22:21 (Douay-Rheims).
62 Luke 23:40-41.
* Matthew 11:12. But see PIERRE ROUSSELOT, THE PROBLEM OF LOVE IN THE
MIDDLE AGES 170 n.96 (Alan Vincelette trans., Marquette Univ. Press 2001).
6 Matthew 21:12-13.
6 Matthew 10:34.
6 JOHN HENRY NEWMAN, PAROCHIAL AND PLAIN SERMONS 199 (Ignatius Press
1997) (1891).
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This is at the very heart of the metaphysics of love: "Assuming
the impossible case that God were not really a good for man,
there would be no reason for man to love."6 This selfsame
goodness wished for the beloved is confirmed by Aristotle: "To
love means to wish another everything we think good, and
moreover for the other's sake, not for our own."6
Herein love gains it proper stature and majesty. The
contemporary caricatures of love, with their reductive carnality,
are exposed in their stark deformity when measured against this
classical expression. St. Augustine underscores this ancient
understanding when he writes, "Love reprimands, ill will
echoes."6 It is the impulse of love to make high demands of the
beloved. C.S. Lewis neatly concludes such a discussion. With all
due deference to the great metaphysicians of the ages, C.S. Lewis
enjoys the uncanny ability to penetrate the deepest human
mysteries and express them with the plainest eloquence. In this
passage from the Problem of Pain, he addresses the dilemma of
the seeming impossibility of God's commandments for man's
happiness, but analogously he addresses the general nature of
love as "violent," demanding from the beloved that which is good
for him, necessitating a painful change for the more perfect:
Love is something more stern and splendid than mere kindness:
that even the love between the sexes is, as in Dante, 'a lord of
terrible aspect.'. . . Kindness, merely as such, cares not
whether its object becomes good or bad, provided only that it
escapes suffering. As Scripture points out, it is bastards who
are spoiled: the legitimate sons, who are to carry on the family
tradition, are punished. It is for people whom we care nothing
about that we demand happiness on any terms: with our
friends, our lovers, our children, we are exacting and would
rather see them suffer much than be happy in contemptible and
estranging modes. If God is Love, He is, by definition,
something more than mere kindness.... He has paid us the
intolerable compliment of loving us, in the deepest, most tragic,
most inexorable sense.
67 PIEPER, supra note 56, at 221 (quoting ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA
THEOLOGIAE, pt. II-Il, Q. 26, art. 13, at 1305).
Id. at 195 (quoting THE RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE, Vol. II, 4; 80 b (John Edwin
Sandys ed., Arno Press 1973)).
69 Id. at 187 (quoting ST. AuGUsTINE, IN EPISToLAM JOHANNES AD PARTHOS 7,
8; PL 35:2033).
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We are, not metaphorically but in very truth, a Divine work of
art, something that God is making, and therefore something
with which He will not be satisfied until it has a certain
character. Here again we come up against what I have called
the 'intolerable compliment.' . . . [I]t is natural for us to wish
that God had designed for us a less glorious and less arduous
destiny; but then we are wishing not for more love but for less.o
Lewis continues to elaborate upon the mystery of the logic of
love as high demand:
Love, in its own nature, demands the perfecting of the beloved;
that the mere 'kindness' which tolerates anything except
suffering in its object is, in that respect, at the opposite pole
from Love. When we fall in love with a woman, do we cease to
care whether she is clean or dirty, fair or foul? Do we not rather
then first begin to care? Does any woman regard it as a sign of
love in a man that he neither knows nor cares how she is
looking? Love may, indeed, love the beloved when her beauty is
lost: but not because it is lost. Love may forgive all infirmities
and love still in spite of them: but Love cannot cease to will
their removal.. . . Of all powers he forgives most, but he
condones least: he is pleased with little, but demands all.
He returns to the subject of love of God with an accuracy and
directness that is arresting:
You asked for a loving God: you have one. The great spirit you
so lightly invoked, the 'lord of terrible aspect,' is present: not a
senile benevolence that drowsily wishes you to be happy in your
own way, not the cold philanthropy of a conscientious
magistrate, nor the care of a host who feels responsible for the
comfort of his guests, but the consuming fire Himself, the Love
that made the worlds, persistent as the artist's love for his work
and despotic as a man's love for a dog, provident and venerable
as a father's love for a child, jealous, inexorable, exacting as love
between the sexes. . . . When we want to be something other
than the thing God wants us to be, we must be wanting what, in
fact, will not make us happy. Those Divine demands which
sound to our natural ears most like those of a despot and least
like those of a lover, in fact marshal us where we should want to
go if we knew what we wanted. He demands our worship, our
obedience, our prostration... . God wills our good, and our good
is to love Him (with that responsive love proper to creatures)
70 C. S. LEWIS, THE PROBLEM OF PAIN 32-35 (Harper Collins 2001) (1944).
71 Id. at 38-39.
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and to love Him we must know Him: and if we know Him, we
shall in fact fall on our faces. If we do not, that only shows that
what we are trying to love is not yet God . . .. Yet the call is not
only to prostration and awe; it is to a reflection of the Divine
life, a creaturely participation in the Divine attributes which is
far beyond our present desires. We are bidden to 'put on
Christ,' to become like God. That is, whether we like it or not,
God intends to give us what we need, not what we now think we
want. Once more, we are embarrassed by the intolerable
compliment, by too much love, not too little.72
To borrow from Mr. Lewis, justice and love are both "of
terrible aspect." Of course, he draws upon the original Latin
sense of terribilis-awe-inspiring, spellbinding. 3  Justice and
love must always be for man-"terrible." But they will only
retain this quality by man's always letting them be what they
are-in their truest nature. Only then can each in its turn
elevate man-and even allow him to touch the face of God.
7 Id. at 39, 46-47.
* Terrible, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM,
dictionary/terrible (last visited Feb. 25, 2013).
http://www.merriam-webster.com/
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